1. "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Dieter Henrich, ed., Kant oder Hegel, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983, pp. 423-38.

2. For alternative versions of foundationalism that view sense experience as nonpropositional, see Laurence BonJour, "The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism," in John Greco and Ernest Sosa (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 117-143, and Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995).

3. John Searle, Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 39.

4. Ibid, p.40

5. William Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 90.

6. Ibid, p. 134.

7. Nor does it follow from it that sense-experiential de re content is not propositional. However, this is of little help to the view I am defending, since a sense experience with p as its de re content is unsuitable as a justifier for the belief that p. Consider again the example of Henry. His sense experience does have as its de re content the proposition that there is a microwave oven on the counter. But surely that doesn't mean that his experience can justify him in believing that there is a microwave oven on the counter.

8. See Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 128f.

9. "The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism," in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, loc. cit.

10. In "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Sellars puts the dilemma as follows: Sensing (the having of sense-data) either is, or is not, a form of knowledge. With regard to putting the matter this way, the intended liabilities of the two horns are obvious. If sensing is a form of knowledge, then the knowledge that is based on sensings is not foundational but inferred. If, on the other hand, sensing is not a form of knowledge, the question arises of how sensing can play the role of a justifier. This particular way of construing the dilemma does not seem to me, however, to pose much of a challenge. It can easily and effectively be rebutted by pointing out that justifiers need not be instances of knowledge. In any case, an alternative way of construing the dilemma is to ask whether the kind of sense-experiential states that are supposed to function as justifiers are justification-bearers themselves. The dilemma, then, is this: Either appearings are capable of being justified, or they are not. If they are, the beliefs they justify cannot be basic. If they are not, they cannot justify at all. However, it seems to me that what is typically thought to turn appearings into justification bearers it the presence of propositional content. It is for this reason that I construe the dilemma as it is displayed in the text.

11. I used to think that the following argument does the trick: Beliefs---the paradigm states that admit of epistemic justification---necessarily involve assent to a proposition. But sense-experiences do not. For when we suspect our senses to deceive us, we do not assent to the proposition that is the content of our sense-experiential state. Consequently, sense experiences are unlike beliefs, and thus do not admit of epistemic justification. Unfortunately, this argument is no good. After all, suspension of judgment admits of epistemic justification just as much as belief. Therefore, the point that sense experience does not always involve assent to a proposition does not establish that it does not admit of epistemic justification.