
G. E. Moore's place in the pantheon of analytic philosophers is secure. None of this book's contributors, most of them prominent epistemologists and ethicists, question his stature, though they agree that Moore bequeathed more questions than answers. The introduction by editors Nuccetelli (St. Cloud State) and Seay (Medgar Evers, CUNY) describes how Moore's stances toward perception, the knowing mind, the external world, and the reality of values have aroused many interpretations and even more conclusions. Contributors such as Crispin Wright, Ernest Sosa, William Lycan, and Paul Snowdon dissect many reconstructions of Moorean foundationalist arguments, each relying on their own distinctive theories of knowledge. Stephen Darwall, Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons, Richard Fumerton, and Jonathan Dancy ponder whether Moore's arguments against fitting values into nature could succeed. Few contributors locate Moore's work within his era's philosophical context; Moore is getting lost in the amnesic fog of analytic philosophy's own making. This book's pursuit of excessively abstract and esoteric questions, detached from the murky past or the practical present, shows how far analytic philosophy has surpassed Moore himself. **Summing Up:** Recommended. Research libraries only, supporting upper-level undergraduates through faculty/researchers. -- *J. R. Shook, University of Buffalo*