## CONTENTS

### ARTICLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globalist Attitudes and the Fittingness Objection</td>
<td>Macalester Bell</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Limits of Modality</td>
<td>Sam Cowling</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert Testimony and Epistemological Free-Riding: the MMR Controversy</td>
<td>Stephen John</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Myth of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value</td>
<td>Dominic McIver Lopes</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doxastic Coercion</td>
<td>Benjamin McMyler</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content</td>
<td>Boyd Millar</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interfering with Nomological Necessity</td>
<td>Markus Schrenk</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus</td>
<td>Hao Tang</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity</td>
<td>Desheng Zong</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DISCUSSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions</td>
<td>Roy T. Cook</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where is the Free Agency in <em>Personal Agency</em>?</td>
<td>C.G. Pulman</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BOOK REVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
visual appearance of what I see and the visual appearances of familiar three-
dimensional objects.' Berkeley wants to explain three-dimensional vision as a whole
and is not to be silenced by passing the buck to our previous three-dimensional
visual experiences. In answer to ( ), Wittgenstein hoped that aspect-dawning would
illuminate the instantaneous experience of understanding a word, etc. The complex
content of a meaning cannot in fact be experienced in an instant, and so
Wittgenstein considers the possibility of 'meaning-blindness' and 'aspect-blindness',
asking whether someone could understand words and use them correctly, without
ever experiencing their meaning, and whether one could, for example, see a shape in a
drawing without seeing the drawing as one of that shape or see
that something is three-dimensional without seeing it as three-dimensional. Schroeder's suggestive
discussion of these questions is, in my view, marred by two defects. First, the
boundary between seeing-as and plain seeing is unclear – colours and shapes
straddle the boundary, since seeing them involves comparison with what we have
previously seen, but unlike many cases of seeing-as, this does not require concepts.
Secondly, he appeals to what is 'hard to imagine', when he should have widened the
bounds of his imagination by considering, e.g., the strange impairment of Merleau-
Ponty's Schneider.

The essays in this volume are worthy tributes to Anthony Kenny. They go some
way towards repaying philosophy's debt to him.

Trinity College, Oxford

Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Edited by Ian

This volume is a long overdue collection of essays on the work of Frank Jackson. No
doubt the broadness of Jackson's interests, which range from philosophy of mind,
language and logic to meta-philosophy, ethics and metaphysics, present a challenge
for any such collection. But the editor comfortably meets the challenge by offering
high quality essays on key topics to which Jackson has made notable contributions.
Fourteen new essays followed by Jackson's replies (part V) make up the collection.
Part I features six papers devoted to topics in metaphysics and philosophical
method, such as the nature of conceptual analysis (Simon Blackburn, William
Lycan), physicalism (Jennifer Hornsby), Jackson's semantics (Laura Schroeter and
John Bigelow, Huw Price), and his theory of colour (Peter Menzies). Part II features
two papers in philosophy of mind. Given the extent of Jackson's contribution to this
area, one would expect more development here, but the reader can find satisfying
discussions of Jackson's knowledge argument (Robert Van Gulick) and his views on
consciousness and physicalism (Phillip Pettit). The contributions in part III are
devoted to three topics in ethics and meta-ethics: consequentialism (Michael Smith),
actualism (Julia Driver) and analytical descriptivism (Terry Horgan and Mark
Timmons). Glaring omissions in this part are examinations of Jackson's defence of
moral functionalism and his reasons for thinking that cognitivists ought to be
reductionists. Part IV, focused on topics in philosophical logic, features two essays
on Jackson’s account of conditionals (Dorothy Edgington, Graham Priest) and one essay on his views on begging the question and the purposes of arguing (Martin Davies).

In most cases, the essays show a breadth of scope that reflects Jackson’s own tendency to connect themes from several areas of interest. All appear in print for the first time, as do the invaluable replies by Jackson. As might be expected from this outstanding list of contributors, the collection gathers first-rate papers that are certain to advance current debates on Jackson’s philosophy. I shall now look closely at the essays by Blackburn, Horgan and Timmons, and Davies, which are among the finest.

Both Blackburn’s ‘Analysis, Description, and the A Priori’ (pp. 23–41) and Horgan and Timmons’ ‘Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth’ (pp. 221–36) take issue with Jackson’s use of conceptual analysis in order to solve the problem of locating properties and facts which might appear mysterious in the natural world. Blackburn has in mind mental and ethical properties (and facts), while Horgan and Timmons focus on ethical ones. In his From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998), Jackson maintains that once the ordinary conceptions of at least some moral predicates are identified and all negotiations are over, they will be found to pick out natural properties. But Blackburn doubts that ‘hidden rules or analyses’ (p. 28) could yield the naturalistic reductions sought by Jackson. He sees no support for Jackson’s programme in the model of science where, he contends, identity statements such as ‘Water is H2O’ were established independently of any ordinary conception of the terms involved. Jackson, however, could agree with this, while insisting that given that there are correct identity statements of this sort, it is possible that the reference (and, on his view, also the meaning) of some moral predicates (and sentences) is identical with the reference of some purely descriptive predicates (and sentences). His confidence that conceptual analysis will eventually reveal the relevant identities rests not on the theoretical identities of science, but on the supervenience of the moral on the natural. Blackburn’s objection then appears to suffer from ignoratio elenchi.

Horgan and Timmons seem sympathetic towards another objection raised by Blackburn (p. 29): even though there is consensus that G.E. Moore’s open question argument fails to show that moral properties cannot be identical with natural properties, the Moorean argument might still be strong enough to generate doubts about those identities. In From Metaphysics to Ethics (p. 150), Jackson dismisses this argument, on the ground that conceptual equivalences between moral and purely descriptive expressions need not be trivial or obvious but could be quite complex and in need of negotiation.

But Jackson’s reductive naturalist programme in ethics, ‘analytical descriptivism’, might face a challenge in Horgan and Timmons’ moral Twin Earth case (pp. 223f.), an attempted reductio of the programme which starts out by assuming one of its central hypotheses, that there will be a convergence of all ordinary conceptions of moral terms in a single folk morality. Moral agents on Earth and Twin Earth, Horgan and Timmons object, could then converge on different ordinary conceptions of moral terms, with humans having a consequentialist conception and Twin
Earthers a deontological one. It seems also not only possible but plausible that in such a scenario Twin Earthers and humans could still engage in genuine moral disagreements, which would require possession of the same moral concepts. To Horgan and Timmons, analytical descriptivism is committed to denying this, thereby amounting to a form of chauvinistic conceptual relativism (pp. 228–32). For suppose that when all negotiations are over, humans identify a certain natural property as the one that fits the rightness role. Analytical descriptivism is committed to denying (i) that Twin Earth agents could intelligibly doubt whether that property is the one picked out by ‘right’, and (ii) that their term ‘right’ is none the less translatable into the orthographically identical human term.

But is the case for this objection coherent? At the very least, Moral Twin Earth appears at odds with the two most accepted accounts of mental (and linguistic) content, since under neither account would humans and Twin Earthers come out as sharing the single conception of rightness needed for Horgan and Timmons’ objection. Construed à la Frege, conceptual identity requires identity in modes of presentation. By hypothesis, humans and Twin Earthers associate different modes of presentation with their utterances of ‘right’, thereby expressing different Fregean concepts. On the other hand, if moral concepts were object-involving, difference in reference would determine difference in content. The possibility of genuine moral disagreement between humans and Twin Earthers does nothing to ensure that their utterances of ‘right’ pick out the same reference. After all, I may deny that jade is a precious stone while you affirm it; I thus disagree with you, even when without our knowledge of this, my tokens of ‘jade’ refer to jadeite and yours to nephrite.

Davies’ ‘Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects’ (pp. 337–89), the longest essay in the collection, looks closely at Jackson’s account of begging the question offered in the last chapter of Conditionals (1987). To Davies, that account gives an insight on the sort of valid arguments that can be properly offered for settling a question. If so, the account could make a contribution to a current debate in epistemology about what goes wrong with the transmission of epistemic warrant in arguments which beg the question, for example, in the Moorean proof ‘(1) Here is a hand; (2) if here is a hand, then there is an external world; therefore (C) there is an external world’.

According to sceptics and some non-sceptics alike, the proof fails to transmit the warrant of premises to conclusion. Critics of it (e.g., Crispin Wright, Stephen Schiffer) hold that perceptual evidence for (1) could provide warrant for (2) only if there is independent warrant for (C). But then any considerations offered for (1) (seeing the hand, in good light, etc.) could count as evidence for it only if (C) is antecedently warranted. James Pryor and other neo-Mooreans (and in some moods, Davies himself) reject this objection, holding that having evidence for (1) suffices to give warrant for (2) to any arguer who is not sceptical about (C). There is no warrant-transmission failure, even though the argument begs the question and is therefore ill suited for the purpose of persuading the external-world sceptic to accept (C). In this essay, Davies sides with Pryor: begging the question is a dialectical phenomenon. But he sees transmission failure as parallel (in the epistemological domain) to begging the question, and goes on to contend that there are two kinds of
transmission failure, depending on whether the project pursued by the argument which fails in this way is settling a question, or deciding what to believe. ‘Begging the question’ would then denote two different properties – one sufficient for rendering a proposed valid argument ill suited for the purpose of convincing, the other rendering it ill suited for the purpose of teasing out the beliefs one already has. Davies agrees with Jackson in considering the Moorean proof ineffectual for settling sceptical questions about the existence of an external world. But on his view, it might still be properly deployed for deciding what to believe (a diagnosis consistent with Moore’s 1939 discussion). Even when qualified in this way, Davies’ analysis leaves the possibility open that in a sense, warrant for (1) may not depend on an antecedent warrant for (C). Readers expecting to find a reply to current objections facing this neo-Moorean position will, however, be disappointed, as will those for whom begging the question is always a type of warrant-transmission failure in the epistemological domain.

St Cloud State University

Susana Nuccetelli